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Abstract. Th e essay deals with the formation of the Greimassian thought from its earliest 
origins in his young years at Kaunas University, i.e. his connections with Wilhelm 
Sesemann, Lev Karsavin and Russian formalism, to the rise of structuralism in Paris. 
Th e Paris School approach stems from Sémantique structurale (1967) leading to the ‘third 
semiotic revolution’, as Greimas called it, by the invention of the modalities. Th is made 
his method close to even analytic philosophy and modal logics. In both, a linguistic 
turn and use of formal logics took place. Yet Greimas’ semiotics grew out of a purely 
linguistic framework into a broader philosophical approach. Nowadays, considered one 
of the classics of the semiotic scene, his method still has not lost anything of its analytic 
acuity and epistemic temptation. Even such new paradigms as existential semiotics grow 
organically from some Greimas’ ideas which have kept their relevance.
Keywords: structuralism; formal logics; modalities; narratology; Paris School; Vladimir 
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Among all the so-called – and also would-be – classics of semiotics during its history 
the case of A. J. Greimas is one of the most fascinating, challenging, provocative, 
and substantial. We know many scholars in the history of ideas, “giants upon whose 
shoulders we stand”, who never cared about creating a school around them despite their 
evident charisma. Greimas was one of such giants, yet he also succeeded in gathering 
around him faithful disciples who continued the doctrine he had created. It is hard to 
say which generation of semioticians he should be classifi ed as. If the fi rst generation 
consisted of scholars of the 19th century such as Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles 
Sanders Peirce, the second generation probably meant the structuralists of the 1960s, 
and the third generation referred to the postmodern thinkers picked out from the 
paradigm, such as Barthes, late Foucault, late Kristeva, Derrida etc., as well as such 
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unclassifi able fi gures like Umberto Eco and Juri Lotman. However, to recall the lecture 
entitled “Vers la troisième revolution semiotique” [“Towards a third semiotic revolution”] 
that Greimas delivered in Finland at the Summer Congress of the Finnish Semiotic 
Society in July 1983, the ‘revolutions’ were, according to him: (1) the invention of 
semantics by Michel Bréal; (2) the invention of structural linguistics by de Saussure; 
and (3) the invention of modalities at the Paris School around Greimas himself.1 
In this essay I try to look at his contribution both from the inside and the outside. 
We could distinguish four phases in it, in chronological order: (1) the origins in Kaunas; 
(2) the beginning – La sémantique structurale (1966); (3) the apogee – the generative 
course and Dictionnaire (1979); and (4) post-Greimassian developments. In fact, I 
found a rather similar periodization of Greimas’ career in an essay written by Paul 
Perron (Perron 2001: 194). He, however, speaks of three phases: (a) defi ning subject/
object relations by a canonical narrative scheme, i.e. either subject has an object or is 
conjuncted with it or he does not, i.e. he is disjuncted from it; (b) modal grammars 
portraying the subject’s competence; and (c) semiotics of passions, i.e. how passions 
modify action (it could be said that this is the supremacy of modalities). Th is equals 
the third phase in my classifi cation.
However, I take the liberty of writing as an insider in the sense that I became 
Greimas’ pupil in the early 1970s and could follow his legendary seminars in Paris. I 
was also able to follow his later developments by personal contact and correspondence 
and in my own research into musical semiotics using his method. Since the 1980s I 
spent more time in the US, though, received new impulses from Bloomington, and 
could see his approach also from the outside, through the eyes of diff erent other schools. 
In general, when reading the Greimas literature in anthologies, encyclopedias and 
monographs one can detect two basic types of discourse surrounding him. One is 
maintained by his faithful disciples trying to preserve the metalanguage intact from 
any changes and transformations as to terminology. Th ey continue the heritage, but the 
problem with this may be that other scholars in the global semiotic community do not 
always understand their vocabulary. On the other hand, the evaluations in encyclopedias 
and course books on semiotics in English do not really nail his contribution, classifying 
him in a manner that either covers only its essential aspects or straightforwardly does 
not comprehend its true nature. So we have to balance between these approaches to 
avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of such extremities.
1 See the DVD: Signifi cant Moments in the History of Semiotics – in Finland and elsewhere. 
Greimas – Lotman – Kristeva – Sebeok – Fontanille – Tarasti. DVD produced by Merja Bauters 
et al., 2007. Metropolia: Helsinki.
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Early infl uences: Sesemann
Th ere is something similar in the early phases of scholars usually considered as 
adversaries, such as, e.g. Th omas A. Sebeok, namely the oblivion of the early stage of 
their careers. In the US no one any longer spoke about the Finno-Ugrian background of 
Sebeok as a Hungarian and distinguished scholar of the Tcheremiss and other Siberian 
Finno-Ugrian tribes. Nor has anything been said about Greimas’ years of study in 
Kaunas, although it is oft en the early years that are decisive in one’s life, off ering a store 
of ideas to which one later returns. Before Rimtautas Kašponis systematically started 
to collect documents on Greimas’ childhood and youth (Kašponis 2014), very little 
was known about it. In this essay I shall not deal with his biography as such, but it is 
signifi cant what he studied, and under whom, at Kaunas University in the 1930s before 
World War II. His study book shows (see Tarasti 2015: 379; a document from Kašponis’ 
sources) that he took a course in logics with the famous Lithuanian philosopher Vasily 
Sesemann, who came from the Parland family in Finland (the most remarkable fi gures 
in the history of Finnish semiotics were Henry and Oscar Parland; see Parland 1991). 
From the essays on culture written as early as in the 1920s by Henry Parland, a kind of 
“Roland Barthes before Barthes”, we know that semiotic ideas had come to his mind via 
the St. Petersburg linguist Viktor Zhirmunskij who was so close a friend of Sesemann’s 
that the wrote a preface to his Aesthetics. 
So Greimas moved in the circles of Sesemann, but also in that of another scholar, 
Lev Karsavin. Karsavin was a philosopher and cultural historian whom Sesemann had 
invited to settle at Kaunas University. Karsavin belonged to the Russian intelligentsia of 
the 1920s (the famous ballet dancer Tamara Karsavina was his sister), but he had learned 
the Lithuanian language so well that later Greimas wrote that it had been Karsavin 
who had shown him that Lithuanian could also be a language of science. Th e life of 
Sesemann has been studied by the German scholar Th orsten Botz-Bornstein (2006); the 
Lithuanian philosopher Leonidas Donskis has edited an English edition of Sesemann’s 
Aesthetics (2007; translated by Mykolar Drunga). As an aside, an English-language 
version of this major work by Sesemann was a project between me and Greimas for 
a long time in the 1980s, and we corresponded on this issue which, however, did not 
become realized then. If we think of Sesemann’s possible intellectual impact on Greimas, 
we can note that he had studied philosophy in St. Petersburg and then at the University 
of Marburg. In Germany Sesemann discovered the Neo-Kantian School of Marburg and 
Freiburg; Nicolai Hartmann, who would become a towering fi gure in modern German 
philosophy, was Sesemann’s classmate in St. Petersburg classical gymnasium. Infl uenced 
by Nikolaj Losskij’s intuitivist philosophy, the Neo-Kantians’ ideas, Hartmann’s ontology 
and philosophical anthropology, as well as phenomenological philosophy, Sesemann 
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wrote numerous articles in German and Russian on philosophical idealism, classical 
and modern epistemology, logic and aesthetics (Donskis 2007: xxv). 
As we know, there is a direct line via Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of symbolic forms 
and Neo-Kantianism to structuralism. Th e three categories of discoursivization: 
spatiality, temporality and actoriality in later Greimas stem from Kant and his a priori 
categories of space, time and subject. So the origin may lie here. 
Moreover, Sesemann was familiar with Russian formalism although he did not quite 
accept all of its ideas. Th e most important point I could fi nd there was that meaning was 
always something ungegenständlich, immaterial; thus very diffi  cult to study empirically. 
In fact, we can fi nd the same argument in Greimas and his notion of isotopy – although 
isotopies could be said to consist of recurrent classemes – as well as in the semiosphere 
of the Tartu-Moscow School or, to put it like the American semiotician John Deely: 
sign is never a thing, it is an object (Deely 2001: 419, 564, et pass.).
In addition, Botz-Bornstein has discovered that for Sesemann meaning was neither 
totally subjective, to be studied as a state of human mind, nor completely objective 
i.e. existing in a text, but living between these, in a form he saw to possess a certain 
rhythm (note what the late Greimas spoke about tensivity and valence). Sesemann 
was infl uenced by Russian formalism but his view of form was rather dynamic, almost 
kinetic. Th e place where he put it between the subjective and the objective comes close 
to Greimas’ concept of le monde naturel which was not natural, but already semiotized 
by the human mind.
As mentioned above, Zhirmunskij was a close friend of Sesemann’s. However, 
Sesemann also criticizes Russian formalists; his view of structure was that it was inner 
rhythm which constituted the true aesthetic moment. Th is was close to Losskij’s notion 
of the organic whole or the Neo-Kantian eff orts to dynamize static logical systems. 
Elsewhere, however, Sesemann emphasized two forms of knowledge, kennen and wissen, 
of which the former was more important (in French philosophy, Vladimir Jankélévitch 
made a similar distinction between connaissance and savoir).
 
Vladimir Propp
Now, we still have to consider the way the ideas of Vladimir Propp reached Greimas 
since my hypothesis is that there might be a “Finnish link” even here.
Th e name that fi rst comes up is certainly that of Vladimir Propp. Th e innovation 
introduced in Morphology of Folktale as early as in 1928 was decisive, and in order 
to understand its fecundity we can only ponder from what kind of network of ideas 
it emerged. Propp’s basic realization when dealing with Russian fairy tales was that 
the elements of one tale could be transferred onto another without any changes. For 
instance, Baba Yaga can appear in most diverse fairy tales and plots. 
 The semiotics of A. J. Greimas 37
Th e very notion of plot is defi ned as follows: one chooses at random one part 
of a tale, provides it with the word ‘about’, and then the defi nition is complete; for 
instance, a tale containing a dragon fi ght belongs to the type “a fairy tale about a fi ght 
with a dragon”. Propp found all earlier classifi cations unsuccessful. For Veselovskij, 
plot consisted of several motifs, a motif develops into a section. Plot is a theme which 
consists of various situations. For him, the motif is primary, the plot is secondary. 
Propp, however, thought that we fi rst have to segment a tale, and only thereaft er can 
we make comparisons.
To what extent did Propp use the Finnish school of folkloristics for his achievement?
Vilmos Voigt answered my question in a letter:
In Russia N. P. Andreev appeared in the Folkore Fellows series, in which his 
two books have been published. I do not know where is his correspondence 
with Kaarle Krohn and Antti Aarne. Andreev was a professor at St. Petersburg 
University, an old fashioned fairy tale type scholar. Probably he was the fi rst who 
thought that one should make a catalogue of Russian folktale types. Th e Russkoe 
geografi cheskoe obshchestvo (whose director was the famous orientalist Duke S. 
F. Oldenburg) founded a skazotshnaya committee, a research committee for folk 
tales. It invited Propp to make a catalogue of fairy tale types. Propp got a grant but 
soon thought that Aarne’s system was outdated and when he had read through 
Afanasjev’s classical fairy tale collection, he realized that many fairy tales followed 
the same structure.
Th is was the birth of Propp’s morphology. He wrote his own book three times. 
First it was a narrative story, what was really no morphology at all. Committee did 
not accept that writing.
Lévi-Strauss published his comments on Propp in his essay entitled “L’analyse 
morphologique des contes russes” in 1960. He praises the translators of Propp’s work 
whose work has done an immense service to the humanities. Lévi-Strauss then 
comments on Propp and admits that the latter’s criticism of earlier scholars (Miller, 
Wundt, Aarne, Veselovskij) is justifi ed: the problem is that one can always fi nd tales that 
simultaneously belong to several categories because classifi cation is based upon types of 
tale or themes which they enact. Th e distinction of theme is arbitrary, though. Aarne’s 
classifi cation provided an inventory of themes which is of big help, but segmentation is 
purely empirical, although the belonging of a tale to any category is always approximate.
Propp’s work was indeed celebrated by the structuralist movement by and large. It 
was one of the starting points for Greimas’ school and he launched the discussion in 
his Sémantique structurale in 1966. Like Lévi-Strauss, he noticed that Propp’s list could 
be made more economic and as to the actant and the actors fulfi lling the functions, one 
could distinguish what he called the mythical actant model with six members: subject, 
object, sender, receiver, helper and opponent.
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However, in his book the concept of an actant appears much earlier than his 
evocation of Propp in the chapter “A la recherché des modèles de transformation” 
(Greimas 1966: 192). Also Greimas tried to reduce the number of functions. 
When the structuralist vogue had lost its attractiveness, what remained was 
narratology, which could still consider Propp as its pioneer: almost all canonical 
analyses of stories start with segmentation. It works even in musical narratology as I 
have tried to show in my study of Chopin’s Ballade G Minor with its modal grammar. 
Yet as Ugo Volli has said about such use of Propp, various authors since Propp have 
tried to extend the morphology to other narrative genres, such as myth, legend, popular 
literature, and modern novel, but in order to do so it is necessary for the analysis to be 
brought upon a higher level of abstraction (Volli 2000: 111). It is hard to imagine any 
other type of systematic narrative study than one stemming from Proppian ‘functions’. 
Still, the above-mentioned Antti Aarne and the Krohn brothers constituted the 
so-called “Finnish school of folkloristics”. I had never heard about it before a trip to 
Brazil where I bought a study by the Brazilian anthropologist Renato Almeida entitled 
A Inteligencia do folklore (Almeida 1974) and to my surprise it contained a chapter on 
Escola fi nlandesa. Still, it might be something of an exaggeration to argue that Propp 
received the intellectual impetus for his Morphology of Folktale from this Finnish. school. 
As Vilmos Voigt has put it, Propp rather criticized Aarne’s methodology. Likewise, 
Grigori Levinton from St. Petersburg European University has told me that the Finnish 
connection was an erroneous hypothesis. Nevertheless, taking into account the whole 
network of ideas around the young Greimas in Kaunas, Sesemann, Karsavin, Zhirmunskij 
in the background, etc., and then the somewhat later Greimas of the mid-1960s aft er 
the publication of the French translation of Propp’s Morphology of Folktale by Seuil, it is 
perhaps not so far-fetched. Why could it be important? Of course because the origin of 
the whole discipline of narratology stems from these sources.
The beginning of Greimas’ structuralism       
We may now skip the post-war phases of Greimas’ journeyman years via Alexandria 
and Ankara and fi nally to France. Naturally, we should not forget the friendship 
between Roland Barthes and Greimas that was established during those years abroad. 
In his history of structuralism, François Dosse (1991) mentions that 1966 that saw the 
publication of Greimas’ Sémantique structurale in the year of “les succes structuralistes” 
stemmed from the Greimas’ seminar at the Institut Poincaré in 1963–1964. Dosse says: 
“L’insistance que met Greimas à defendre une sémiotique générale embrassant tous les 
systèmes de signifi cation à l’ouverture du travail linguistique sur tout autres champs” 
(Dosse 1991: 262). So Barthes’s Elements de sémiologie that was published in 1968 
was clearly written from the Greimassian perspective of general semiotics. Th en, once 
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Greimas had received his position at the EPHE in 1965 with the help of Lévi-Strauss, 
structuralism had a steady foothold in French academic life. 
What was involved was in fact a kind of ‘linguistic turn’ on the French soil. Yet 
Dosse’s characterization is correct and more justifi ed than those in later encyclopedias of 
semiotics which all emphasize the linguistic, text-based aspect of Greimassian semiotics, 
although ever since the beginning its goal obviously had been more “universal” and 
transdisciplinary. However, the scientifi c ideal of structuralism, i.e. extreme formalism 
and formalization, was apparent in Sémantique structural, so that the fi nal result of any 
analysis was a quasi-algebraic, achronic structure. Dosse (1991: 266) ironizes thus: 
someone had ready a Greimassian analysis of marriage, which ended aft er one thousand 
pages concluding that marriage is a binary structure. Moreover, Dosse (1991: 274) 
crystallizes his interpretation of the 1960s, stating that in spite of their diff erences Lévi-
Strauss, Greimas and Lacan constituted the trio of the most scientifi c structuralism: 
“Ce sont les trios fl eurons de la pensée formelle à son zenith”. In a conversation Greimas 
once told me that his method was so rigorous that he could sign any study of his pupils, 
the method would automatically guarantee the results. Back then, I did not have the 
courage to oppose, although I thought that then there would be no change or progress 
in science. “Das Wahre war schon längst gefunden, [hat edle Geisterschaft  verbunden;] 
das alte Wahre fass es an”, as Goethe (1840: 268) put it!
However, when arriving at Greimas’ seminar in Paris as a young passionate Lévi-
Straussian structuralist, I soon noticed that I did not understand almost anything 
happening in the lively discussions among the mostly Italian, Latin American and 
French pupils of Greimas. Th e reception was of this kind: Greimas introduced me as 
“a compatriote of George Henrik von Wright”, the philosopher who was successor of 
Wittgenstein in Cambridge and had developed the deontic logic that Greimas admired. 
Th at happened in the mid-1970s, when I also twice interviewed Roland Barthes, who 
would have liked to accept me to his seminar; however, when he heard I was already 
at Greimas’, he lost interest.
Anyway, I quickly realized that fi rst I had to study Sémantique structurale and the 
best way to do this for a foreigner was to translate it into his own language, in my 
case Finnish. I started the translation in Paris but it appeared in Finland only much 
later, in 1982, aft er several revisions (the Finnish language does not have the Greco-
Roman-based terminology and so much of the new vocabulary of semiotics just had 
to be invented).
Still, the year of the original publication of Greimas’ work was the year of the 
‘structural’– Dubois told Greimas, that if he added the term ‘structural’ to semantics, 
a thousand more copies of the book would be sold (Dosse 1991: 385). It was the time 
of Lévi-Strauss’s Structural Anthropology and Rolan Barthes’ L’homme structural. What, 
then, was the innovative aspect of this important book?
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For the fi rst, one could see that it was a time not far from the phenomenology of 
Merleau-Ponty, or Karl Jaspers – the philosophy is looming in its background. Th e fi rst 
defi nition of meaning is just one of perception: one has to perceive two diff erent terms 
simultaneously. In the beginning the fi eld of empirical sign studies is mentioned, as the 
classifi cation of signs by their signifi ers (visual, auditive, tactile etc.), but it is quickly 
abandoned in favour of semantics. Th e fi rst method Greimas proposes is semeanalysis, 
and here, of course, we come close to linguistics and binary oppositions. Also a whiff  
of information theory, cybernetics and computer studies counting on 0 or 1 is present. 
Th e analysis of the lexeme ‘head’ is the model example of such an extremely taxonomic 
analysis. Th e level of semiology is defi ned.
From the semiotic square and isotopies to narratology
Nevertheless, Greimas does not actually introduce his famous semiotic square yet, 
although its elements are already clearly present; as everybody knows, the square 
as such was an old logicians’ model which Greimas only brought into the semiotic 
discussion. Its purpose has been to provide a reading model for any empirical fi eld 
or phenomenon whose structure and organization are unknown, chaotic, disordered. 
By using the square, a certain order appears. Th e origin is purely linguistic, but in its 
general meaning and use the model is a hypothesis of a cognitive deep structure in 
the brain. One can presume that phenomena follow its law and if we know what S1 
and, say, non-S2 are, we may try to infer what the missing parts are. Moreover, in case 
of temporal semantic universes and texts, the square creates a virtuality for expecting 
what will happen next in the “becoming” of a text. Let us say, if a composer fi rst gives 
the listener S2 and non-S1, then when will he give S1 and non-S2? (Th is was the case 
with Chopin’s Polonaise-fantasie as I have tried to show). Th is has a narrative arch; 
the tension is created due to the postulated structure. Some even have a mystic view 
on the square regarding the signifi cation emanating from it organically. However, if 
seen more modestly, it is an important working method and research tool, to be used 
on any level of text.
Th e fi rst really new concept launched there was the one of isotopy – in English it 
should perhaps be called ‘isotopicity’, i.e. the quality of having isotopes. Yet this deep 
level of meaning inherent in any text, based empirically on contextual semes and their 
recurrence, but cognitively, as a mental category, making even the most fragmentary 
text coherent, is already characteristic of the expansion of the purely linguistic domain 
to a more philosophical one. How can one for instance prove the existence of isotopy 
to someone who does not perceive its presence or understand it? Th ere is no way to do 
that. For instance, in performing arts one may notice that a certain musical, theatrical, 
fi lmic, gestural (in dance) interpretation etc. is wrong, but so wrong that it cannot be 
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corrected by just changing some signifi ers (“Play louder here, faster here, more slowly 
here.”) No, it is wrong because the performer did not catch the isotopy. 
It must be admitted that from the moment of launching isotopies, Greimassian 
semiotics became something more, and broader, than pure ‘lexicography’ as Th omas 
Sebeok portrayed it or ‘narrative discourse grammatics’. Of course, Greimas essentially 
remained faithful to his linguistic turn; for instance, he said: “Th ere are no truths, there 
are only statements about the truth”. Moreover, the fact that isotopies appeared and 
became manifest when they changed, as in cases of bi-isotopies or complex isotopies, 
added an exciting aura to the notion. For example, Oscar Wilde writes a play Th e 
Importance of Being Earnest (cf. Ernest = a person, earnest = honest). As Greimas put 
it, any witty talk is based on playing with complex isotopies. Later, in his study on 
Maupassant he shows how an isotopy makes an otherwise fragmentary text coherent 
thanks to the spatial isotopy of Paris. 
Isotopy is certainly one of Greimas’ great contributions to semiotic vocabulary; in 
fact, it is close to Lotman’s ‘semiosphere’ which has also been claimed to lie in the origin 
of any meaning and defi ne it as a continuum of signs. Here, extremities meet: let us 
remember late Peirce and his principle of synechism, of a universe where ‘tout se tient’ 
as Greimas would have put it! Isotopy is something to be preserved in any 21st-century 
semiotics, irrespective of its epistemological ground. 
Yet the riches of Sémantique structurale do not end here. Th e Proppian heritage is 
present in the actant model. Th e Greimassian version of Proppianism was just in the 
abridgement of actants into six major actantial roles: sender, receiver, subject, object, 
helper and opponent. Th is remained perhaps the most popular of Greimas’ innovations, 
much applied in diff erent empirical domains. Th is was prophetically foreseen by 
Greimas himself, when he made several diff erent “thematic investments”: a philosopher 
of the classical age, a Marxist, an economist, a psychoanalyst. Subsequently he ponders 
the transformations of Propp’s functions and moves increasingly closer to extremely 
formalized reductions. 
A little later came the canonical narrative scheme above which Ugo Volli (2000: 
120–123) formulated as follows: S  O Subject is conjuncted with Object, or S  O 
Subject is disjuncted from Object2. Th en actions can be portrayed as: S1 – (S2  O 
i.e. Subject S1 gives a gift  of O to subject S2 i.e makes him conjuncted; or makes so 
that S2 abandons it, is deprived of it S1 – (S2  O). And this means that a story starts 
when S1 – (S2 – (S3  O): this is the same as make one do something (faire faire) or 
S1 – (S2 – (S3  O). Th ese schemes fi t all narratives. 
Now it might be asked how to situate Greimas in the context of analytic philosophy. 
According to Nathan Houser, the latter has three requirements: (1) the linguistic turn – 
present in Greimas; (2) the use of formal logic – present in Greimas (particularly later 
2 “Il soggetto è congiunto con l’Oggetto; S  O Il soggetto è disgiunto dall’oggett” (Volli 2000).
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in his theories of modalities); (3) the correct philosophical style – this is diffi  cult to say 
and depends on how you defi ne it. 
At this point, one may already enquire what the purpose of this type of semiotic 
analysis is. Is this method an extreme reductionism whereby concrete phenomena 
are reduced into abstract schemes? For the fi rst, why should we translate everything 
from its original language into a very complicated metalanguage? Th e answer is that 
in such a reduction new logical possibilities and worlds are revealed in the studied 
phenomena, dimensions which would otherwise remain hidden. On the other hand, 
such a metalanguage can serve as an international language of scholars, revealing 
hitherto concealed new connections between phenomena in the intercultural and 
transdisciplinary fi eld. Results in one fi eld can benefi t others when the shift  from one 
to the other is made possible by a common metalanguage. For instance, results in the 
narrative study of literature or cinema can be used in musicology, media, education or 
sociological or cultural studies. Th is is certainly not far from the idea of unifi ed science 
entertained by the logical empirists in the 1920s.
At the end of Sémantique structurale an example of the method is given in a 
study of George Bernanos’ novel Journal d’un cure à la campagne [Diary of a Country 
Priest]. If one has seen Robert Bresson’s fi lm based on the novel, one will understand 
its existentialist nature even better. Th e idea of the narrative focuses around its main 
protagonist, the young priest in his fi rst parish with an idealist Jesus Christ project who 
would convert all his villagers into true Christianity. Yet he fails because he does not 
understand which kind of sign he is for the people around him. Taking into account the 
existentialist atmosphere of the whole, one is simultaneously fascinated and astonished 
by the rigorous taxonomic approach of its structural semantics, which approaches its 
existential message with a cold-blooded method and glance. Th ere is an interesting 
contradiction involved here.
Apogee: Dictionary and the generative course
Sometime in the mid-1970s Greimas developed the idea of putting all the notions he 
had hitherto elaborated into what he called a ‘generative course’. Generative models had 
become fashionable due to Noam Chomsky, and tree diagrams were being applied to 
all sign systems, even to music as by Lerdahl and Jackendoff  1985 or by the conductor 
Leonard Bernstein in his lecture series Unanswered Question from 1973. Th e grammar 
behind any sign manifestation or text was supposed to have a deep structure and 
surface, and the depth was schematized like in Chomsky’s example phrase: “John beats 
his sister”. So the originally linear syntactic or syntagmatic chain of signs was shown to 
be rather a hierachic construction in which signs in the chain were not of equal value. 
Of course, the idea of deep structure was launched already by other structuralists, but 
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it suited Greimas well. Since the beginning there had been the idea of manifest and 
immanent levels therein. Syntactic and semantic columns were parallel phenomena in 
the model and it was possible to follow how the text was either produced from the deep 
level isotopies via discoursivization to the surface, or the surface gradually reduced to 
dense abridged deep level structures such as for instance the semiotic square. Th ese 
two courses – the top-down and the bottom-up one – ran parallel to the idea that a 
text could be produced from some essential principles or else these principles were 
gradually revealed and inferred when starting from the text’s smallest elements, by a 
kind of ars combinatoria. No one questions the process itself and its logical, almost 
‘organic’ coherence. It was not far from the old Goethean idea of an Urpfl anz from 
which all later plants would originate, or, to give an analogy from music, the theory 
by Heinrich Schenker of Ursatz to which where any tonal music piece ended. Nor is it 
far from Heideggerian metaphysics and ontology. 
Yet a semiotician keener on realism would think that the generation of one level 
from another is perhaps not a phenomenon of logical organic growth, but contains 
irrational leaps, gaps and confl icts. Th is, however, remained beyond the structuralist 
tradition of semiotics to which Greimas remained faithful. Th inking of the situation 
epistemologically, one may ponder whether the idea to put all Greimas’ hitherto 
invented notions into the straightjacket of parcours génératif was a good one or not. 
Th e application of such generation was met with diffi  culties from the very beginning. 
One major question was when to start to apply it and when to stop. If the problem 
being investigated was restricted to a certain level of generation, why should one launch 
the whole heavy apparatus to reveal its organization? Greimas never spoke about the 
‘bon usage’ of his model; in a word, there had to be a higher-level logic somewhere, 
prompting when to start and when to stop using the generative model. Th e case of 
the Finnish theatre scholar Kari Salosaari (1989) is a good example. He created an 
extremely complex generative model for actor’s work in drama and even used it in his 
experimental theatre productions of certain classics from Shakespeare to Sophokles. Yet 
at the defence of his doctoral thesis he could not answer the question of which kind of 
sign is an actor who is playing someone sleeping and then really falls asleep on stage. 
Gianfranco Marrone (2014: 51) has recently pondered and well clarifi ed these 
problems in his study Th e Invention of the Text. He argues: 
Th e text appears, therefore, as the tip of the iceberg of the generative trajectory 
of meaning, the place where this trajectory acquires an expression-substance 
and thus makes an empirical concreteness, becomes communicable, cognizable 
and reachable. [...] Th e generative trajectory of meaning is in turn the simulation 
of the diff erent levels of relevance in which meaning textualizes itself. [...] Any 
human and social signifi cation can be described by the semiotician at diff erent 
levels, more or less abstract, more or less simple [...]. It can be performed at the 
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level of elementary structures [...] (the semiotic square) [...] it can be performed 
at the level of narrativity [...] at the discursive level where enunciating subject uses 
the underlying structures by giving them specifi c actors, spaces and times [...]. In 
this view, the text results from a diff erent operation: textualisation. Textualisation 
works by stopping the generative trajectory at some level and revealing it. 
Th is, however, was said much later. 
Modalities
Nevertheless, side by side with parcours génératif also totally new elements were 
elaborated by the Paris School, ideas that in the course of time would survive the 
scientifi c fashions better. One such innovation was introduced by Greimas in his famous 
lecture “Vers la troisième revolution sémiotique” given at Jyväskylä in 1983 – it was the 
discovery of modalities. Th is notion changed the whole paradigm radically: instead of 
studying the structure of an object or a text, the attention was shift ed to the subject and 
his/her activities and attitudes towards the object. In fact, this almost meant abandoning 
the old structuralist idea of focusing on a text.
When consulting a French dictionary, we can fi nd the defi nition of ‘modalities’. 
If one is a music scholar, one should be careful not to confuse them with modal 
scales and church tones. Here, modalities mean only the ways whereby the speaker 
animates his/her speech according to his/her wishes, hopes, certainties, uncertainties, 
abilities, etc. So modalities provide an essential source of meanings present in any 
communication. Th inking of Saussure’s famous diagram of a dialogue, Mr. A saying 
something to Mr. B, the space between them is not empty or a vacuum: already before 
any act of communication, before anything has been uttered, it is fi lled by modalities. 
Modalization is the process whereby modalities penetrate the discourse. Yet there is 
the ‘enunciated enunciation’, i.e. the process has already been put in the discourse and 
its structure as in “J’espère qu’il vienne” [“I hope he will come.”]. Not all languages have 
this prominent quality, say, the Finno-Ugrian languages have only a few such cases of 
the subjunctive, as the Finnish ‘hän tullee, hän mennee’, which conveys uncertainty. 
Th erefore it can be asked whether modalities are a universal feature of all semiosis. Th e 
anthropologist Elli-Kaija Köngas-Maranda once told me that she wondered whether 
her indigenous people in Polynesia would have an idea of “dürfen, wollen, können” 
(for some reason she used German words) and what these meant. Once lecturing 
at a Greimas seminar in Paris I said that I did not know if, for instance, there were 
modalities in the Chinese language. Aft erwards, two Chinese students approached me, 
feeling upset that I had been underestimating Chinese culture in this respect as if it 
were lacking something essential for communication. Th at had by no means been my 
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intention. To the contrary, I do believe that modalities, the fundamental ones of ‘being’, 
‘doing’ ‘appearing’ and maybe ‘becoming’ are universal, as well as other modalities of 
‘know’, ‘must’, ‘can’ and ‘will’. I use the modalities in this way in English for the sake of 
brevity, instead of saying ‘to be obliged to’ or ‘to be able to’. Of course we can also argue 
that there might be more modalities than those hitherto listed by the Greimas’ school. 
One problem arising in a concrete text or discourse analysis is of course that 
modalities appear via what Greimas calls ‘aspectualization’, i.e. some modality is 
present suffi  ciently/insuffi  ciently or excessively/inexcessively. Th is gave me the idea, 
so to say, to ‘digitalize’ modalities which as such are of a continuous nature in my music 
analyses. So I could give for instance fi ve values according to the extent to which a 
modality was functioning in the text: ‘very much’, ‘much’, ‘neutrally’, ‘insuffi  ciently’, 
‘inexcessively’, or ‘++’, ‘+’, ‘0’, ‘–’, ‘– –’. Th e next question was: on which competence 
can a reader make this interpretation, does it have an objective basis or is it totally 
subjective and arbitrary? Earlier I tended to think that the modal values were based 
upon the previous articulations of space, time and actors on the discoursive level. So 
the devices of disengagement and engagement were important. Sometimes these terms 
created more confusion, for instance when one colleague once said aft er my speech: “I 
agree that political engagement is important even in semiotics. However, nowadays I 
am inclined to think that modalities are primal, and then they become more concrete 
and articulated signs.” Ultimately one can write a modal grammar of a whole text 
using the Greimassian symbolic notation. For instance, quoting the modal grammar 
on Chopin’s Ballade G Minor (see Fig. 6.6 in Tarasti 1979: 179).
Such an enterprise is very Greimassian and stucturalist in its endeavour to crystal-
lize the result of the analysis into simple logical schemes. Yet, the pragmatic diffi  culty 
here lies in the fact that in the empirical fi eld of music those who are supposed to read 
such studies and benefi t from them in their interpretations most oft en are not trained 
in formal logics and hence are unable to understand what is involved. So in this case 
the results should be expressed via a notation like the standard musical score, i.e. notes 
which the majority understands. Th is has happened in the so-called Schenker method 
of music analysis.
As another illustration the work of the Finnish theatre scholar Kari Salosaari could 
be quoted. In 1989 Salosaari published a systematic study about the actor’s work 
which was completely based on Greimas’ generative course. His empirical object was 
a 10-minutes-long video section from the stage performance of Carlo Goldoni’s play 
Il baruff o in Chioggia, fi lmed at the drama studio of an avant-garde Finnish theatre in 
Tampere. Among other things, he showed what a complex network of modalizations 
takes place in a simple dialogue between the two actors playing Isidoro and Checca on 
stage. A diagram, quoted in Tarasti 2015: 217, reveals his idea of the modal nature of 
such a communication, the theatre being always “communication of communication” 
as the Czech scholar Ivo Osolsobě used to say.
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It appears that in the scheme Salosaari left  the abridged symbols of modalities 
to follow French and not Finnish, which probably made his study less accessible. 
Unfortunately, Salosaari’s book has not yet been translated into English or French 
although it is certainly one of the most Greimassian works ever completed.
Another empirical application of Greimas’ idea of generation appears in an essay 
on gastronomy (Tarasti 2015). Just like in my studies on musical narrativity, here only 
certain elements are chosen from the original generative trajectory, namely those which 
seemed to be relevant for the object. So facts are not forced into theoretical schemes but 
their selection depends on the phenomenon itself, and its isotopies: the application of 
Greimas tries to be fl exible, ‘idoneist’ as the Swiss mathematician Gonseth has said (Fig. 1).
???????????
?
?
?
????????????
?
?
?
????????????
?
???? ????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
?????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
??? ????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?
?????????????
?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????
?????
????????
????????
????
?????????????
???????????????????????????????
????????????? ????????? ????????? ???????????
?????????????????????????????????????????
????????
?????????
????????
???????
????????
??????
Figure 1. Generation of food (modifi ed from Tarasti 2015: 258).
modalizations
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Epistemologial refl ections
Th e generative trajectory was also visited by Paul Ricoeur in his famous speech at the 
Colloque de Cerisy in 1983. His talk was published in the booklet series Bulletin of 
the Paris School and thereaft er appeared in Temps et récit II. La confi guration dans le 
récit de fi ction (Ricoeur 1984: 49–51). His major point was that in his opinion Greimas 
had tried to build achronic principles of narrativity which existed before the story was 
told, i.e. before anything was manifested. Th erefore, regarding the Proppian approach, 
he chose a way to enrich its paradigmatic aspect, i.e. the actants instead of functions 
whose list had been much longer (31) than that of the actants (6) to start with. What 
disturbed Ricoeur was just stepping outside the temporal aspect of any narration, yet 
the major epistemological problem for him was whether the surface grammar was richer 
than the fundamental grammar. If the process is supposed to be generative, everything 
should be included in the axioms and no additional elements smuggled in during the 
trajectory. Th is gradual enriching of the model proceeds perhaps from our competence 
and from our empirical familiarity with all kinds of stories. Ricoeur crystallized his 
point as follows: Greimas’ analysis is teleologically guided by the anticipation of the 
fi nal stage, that means, narration as a process of creating values. We might add here that 
Greimas is revealed to be rather Hegelian claiming that ‘the absolute’ only appeared at 
the end of the world process and development of the spirit. 
What then are those “inserted” or smuggled elements in Greimas’ system? Ricoeur 
mentions three: (1) the aspectual structure, i.e. inchoativity, durativity and terminativity 
which are not well defi ned in relation to fundamental structures; (2) the strongly 
axiological nature of contents to be invested in the semiotique square (he certainly means 
the articulation of life/death and nature/culture). Ricoeur rather considers them to contain 
a euphoric or dysphoric character; (3) the role of destinator; to put it: communication 
which is the dynamic aspect of signifi cation and which Greimas elegantly calls “operational 
syntagmatisation”. Ricoeur’s analysis remains one of the sharpest philosophical comments 
on Greimas. From an “existential” point of view that the generative trajectory looks a little 
like the Hegelian palace criticized by Kierkegaard; it is fi ne but the only default element 
is that the subject does not live there but in a dog hut by its side. Of course those who see 
Greimas as an incurable nominalist whose slogan was “No salvation outside the discourse” 
defend the generative construction as a machine of textualization. Rather analogous was 
the case of Juri Lotman, who considered culture as consisting of texts, but supposed there 
loomed somewhere inside any culture a procedure or a device or a mechanism which 
was producing the texts, textualizing the world; or, as Jorge Borges has said, world was a 
book into which all events we were written.
Th e problem with all these text-based semiotic systems lies, as Ricoeur has already 
put it, in the text’s temporal nature, it having a beginning and an end. So what to think 
of such texts as architecture, painting, sculpture etc. without time? By talking about 
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text or discourse as well, we secretly introduce strong hypotheses about the nature of 
these semiotic objects. Th is was in fact already noticed by Th omas Winner and Irene 
Portis Winner. 
But is the text everything in Greimas? Even Marrone who wants to underline the 
role of text, fi nally admits: 
It is therefore necessary to suppose the existence of some kind of element – cultural, 
historical, scientifi c, social – that is a constructing subject, either individual or 
collective, taking charge of placing the relationship, of making it relevant and 
valid within the socio-cultural universe. (Marrone 2014: 56–57) 
Th e radical innovation occurred in the 1970s – let me once again emphasize the 
discovery of modalities, because it changed the entire research strategy which was no 
longer the study of a fi xed object, i.e. a text, nor the study of the mind of a subject as 
it is in cognitive studies, but lied in the relations of the subject to the object, i.e. the 
modalization.
In fact, one may say that this had been Greimas’ original plan since the beginning. In 
a recent essay Eric Landowski has spoken about the existential dimension in Greimas, 
manifested as early as in Sémantique structurale. Landowski correctly states: 
Th e Greimassian thought was fi rst and foremost motivated to explore meaning 
in general. Greimas was not only interested in the signifi cation of texts but in the 
‘signifi cation of human activities’ in the signifi cation of history or simply as he 
oft en put it in ‘the signifi cation of the living experience’. [...] His starting point is 
the situation of man [...]. But at the same time he showed greatest possible vigilance 
against the risk of slinking into impressionistic or psychologizing discourse, or of 
contenting oneself with a speculative kind of inquiry. (Landowski 2013: 11–12) 
Yet, the problem of experienced meaning soon turned into the problematics of 
manifested meaning. For Landowski, Greimas thought that the only relevant issue was 
to understand “in which conditions and by which process our existence in the world 
makes sense” (Landowski 2013: 12). So the existential turn was reduced back to the 
linguistic turn in the sense that the meaning was supposed to appear best in an uttered 
text. Yet taking into account the existential or experiential dimension did not exclude 
or ignore earlier results of the studies of textuality carried out during the last decades. 
Th e semantic world was only seen as identical with the living world, inside which we 
are defi nitely closed. Th us Landowski (2013: 15) has to repeat the slogan Hors du texte 
point de salut. Th is meant that the regime outside the text – ‘regime’ being Landowski’s 
favourite term in his social semiotics – was a prohibited zone. Subsequently Landowski 
develops his own new research line where he distinguishes the subject’s existential 
styles, such as programming and manipulating.
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Post-Greimassian era
However, now we have already glided into the post-Greimassian era. So what happened to 
his school and system aft er Greimas? Some pupils of Greimas had already in his lifetime 
been developing in diff erent directions, fertilizing the authentic doctrine with all kinds of 
innovations. Among them is of course Jacques Fontanille, one of the most open-minded 
scholars of the school who made remarkable fi ndings in the study of space, light, and 
corporeal semiotics, the latter in his monograph Séma et soma (2004) where he launched 
the philosophical distinction of Moi and Soi into semiotics. Some others have continued 
strictly on what they thought was the primal and original Greimas, like Anne Henault, 
Claude Zilberberg etc.; some discovered new fi elds of application like Ivan Darrault-Harris 
in psychiatry. Th e strong Italian School continued educating semioticians in a strict 
Greimassian doctrine, but would pay much attention to the contemporary economic 
world, media, etc.: scholars like Paolo Fabbri, Guido Ferrari, Ugo Volli, Gianfranco 
Marrone, Omar Calabrese, Isabella Pezzini have made serious work along these lines. 
Huge quantities of studies have appeared, yet, essentially, Greimas has been considered 
a scholar who had found the truth and put it in his writings in an epigrammatic form, 
like the inscriptions on the ancient stones of Antiquity. 
Already early on, the Dictionary contained trends to elaborate his schemes further 
with a more dynamic outlook. Th e semiotic square was temporalized, words like ‘be-
coming’ (devenir) appeared among the fundamental modalities. Th e theory itself 
was already in motion. Yet, as we know no one can enter the Greimassian universe 
by reading the Dictionary fi rst. In order to understand it, one should have read all 
previous literature and, if possible, have attended those endless discussions in Paris 
seminars and cafeterias. Outside the European context the theory has fl ourished alike 
in South America as well as in Iran which has recently shown its strength in semiotics 
by analysing the old and contemporary Persian culture with Greimassian notions. 
Th is has mostly happened around Reza Hamid Shairi in Tarbiat Modares University in 
Teheran. However, we are still waiting for the encounter of the Iranian philosophical 
tradition and a “modern” or “postmodern” semiotic approach.
The existential turn
Nevertheless, in his last phase, the semiotics of passions, Greimas himself had already 
hinted at the ontological questions as the basis of his thought. He launched new notions 
of ‘phorique’ tensivity, and valence, the former of which was the same as Husserl’s 
pretention of a subject; so he referred to the phenomenological aspect of his theories, 
not mentioned since the quoting Merleau-Ponty in his early writings. In the end what 
was involved was the argument: 
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Th e being of the world and subject do not depend on semiotics but on the ontology, 
it is to use the jargon the manifesting of the manifested what we are searching for. 
(Greimas, Fontanille 1991: 15, 25–27)      
At this point, it is certainly appropriate to say a word about existential semiotics. Th is 
term probably fi rst appeared in the monograph Existential Semiotics (Tarasti 2000), 
which was one of the last semiotic treatises produced in the series once established by 
Th omas Sebeok at Indiana University Press. It must be said as a comment that in spite 
of his well-known hostility towards the French School, Sebeok published many English 
translations of Greimas’ works (like the Dictionary) at Indiana University Press. Th e new 
theory of existential semiotics was in fact a combination of continental philosophy in the 
line of Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, Sartre, de Beauvoir, Wahl, Marcel, 
etc. and classic semiotics, including Greimas. In this sense it was a synthesizing eff ort 
inside the European intellectual tradition, yet on the other hand, it was a rather radical 
eff ort of renewal, of creating a new theory or what I would later call ‘neosemiotics’ of 
the 21st century. 
Th e starting points were temporality, subjectivity, logic of change, fl ux, qualitative 
research, experience, existentiality, values, and transcendence. Its fi rst models were 
indeed far afi eld from the Cartesian squares and layered structures to be found in 
Greimas. It adopted a new outlook by using circular models, arrows portraying the 
‘journeys’ of the subject beyond his/her living world now called by the untranslated 
(or untranlatable) German word Dasein. Th us it seemed to be something opposed to 
the Paris School, but it was not so in the end. 
Still, in this existential theory much is based upon dialectics between the present and 
the absent, say, the interaction between the empirical reality and transcendence. Th e 
easiest defi nition of transcendence was certainly “anything which is absent but present 
in our minds”. However, the notion of transcendence launched into semiotics was 
neither of a theological nor of a psychological (psychedelic ‘trip’) or an anthropological 
(a shamanistic practice) origin, but conceptual and philosophical. In this sense it was 
rather stemming from Immanuel Kant. Yet, as could be expected, it was always an object 
of misunderstanding. So in the end, in the present state of the theory, I distinguish three 
kinds of transcendences: (1) the empirical one, transcendence a posteriori, according to 
our daily experience; (2) the existential one: I can stop in my action, living, experiencing 
and step into the transcendence; at any moment, I can say like Faust: “Verweile doch, 
du bist so schön”; (3) the radical one: it is the theological one present in many thinkers 
through ages such as Dante, Th omas Aquinas, Ibn Arabi, Avicenna up to the American 
transcendentalists, Emerson, etc. In any case, it is opposed to the idea that the semantic 
universe, the living world where we are – or into which we have been “cast” – is closed. 
As semiotic “animals” we can even amidst our corporeality step outside this process at 
any time. Anyway, the notion of transcendence with all its varieties can lead to what 
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I called a transcultural theory of transcendence, whereby we can compare diff erent 
cultures and their views of transcendence. Th is is to continue the debate started by the 
American linguist Walburga von Raffl  er-Engel about crosscultural misunderstandings, 
an extremely topical issue in the contemporary world of huge immigration movements 
and cultural confl icts, involving diverse uses of the transcendental idea. We have to 
remember that it is the most abstract theories that will prove to be the most infl uential 
ones in the end with their pragmatic applications.
Further, other elements were included in the theory of Dasein stemming from the 
Hegelian logics. Th e categories of an-sich-sein and für-sich-sein, being-in-oneself and 
being-for-oneself, were very important. Th e case was further enriched by inserting 
Fontanille’s categories of Moi and Soi so that we ended up with a ‘semiotic square’: 
Being-in-myself = Moi1 = body as such; Being-for-myself = Moi2 = person, habit; 
Being-for-oneself = Soi2 = social practices; and Being-in-oneself = Soi1 = values and 
norms. So we reached the familiar semiotic square aft er all! (Strictly speaking it was not 
quite the semiotic square with its logical implications, but still something along those 
lines.) Yet very soon the theory went further and the square was replaced by what is 
called the ‘Zemic’ model, the letter Z symbolizing the movement within the structure 
either from body – by gradual sublimation – into values, or from abstract values – by 
stepwise embodiment – into our primal corporeal behaviour.
Th e part ‘-emic’ evoked Kenneth Pike’s theory of the emic and etic aspects or 
categories, ‘emic’ being the internal and ‘etic’ the external. Th e model was intended to 
portray nothing less than the human mind, aft er all. Th en the truly semiotic problem of 
course was how it manifested in signs and texts, so how it was textualized. Nevertheless, 
the semiotic moment was not seen as something added only later, when we need to 
manifest or “utter” this state of aff airs, but it was included in the movement of “semiotic” 
signifying forces within the model itself.
However, I do not see any contradiction between being an existential semiotician 
and still continuing to conduct Greimassian analyses of any kind of sign complexes 
or signifying phenomena: my recent treatise Sein und Schein (Tarasti 2015) contains 
strictly Greimassian analyses side by side with existential refl ections (e.g. an analysis 
of Wagner’s Die Walküre, Act 2, Scene 4).
We know that many contemporary theories in human sciences use semiotics, but, 
alas, without mentioning the origins. One does not necessarily need to start ab ovo, 
but without a certain kind of erudition in the fi eld of the history of ideas, the new 
semiotics remains rather superfi cial and its results not lasting ones. For instance, 
Deleuze’s thought is full of semiotics but people just quote Delezue and do not take 
him as a semiotician. Th e same goes for all those Parisian geniuses who once became 
fashionable in the American academic world, starting from Foucault and Derrida up 
to Barthes. Fortunately, Greimas never had to endure this fate. Even in France his 
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thought was not “bien mediatisé”, so it could develop more peacefully according to its 
inner logic and on a deeply refl ective level. 
In British cultural theory which has become predominant in social studies and the 
humanities, Greimas is seldom mentioned. In fact, it could be studied how well and 
to which extent diverse parts of the Greimassian heritage have been received. If many 
can understand its popular models of actants or even isotopies, there are rather few 
of those who have seriously continued writing modal grammars. Yet we cannot stop 
the time and even scientifi c theories have their aspectualities i.e. initium, motus and 
terminus or inchoativity, durativity and terminativity; but as we know from music, the 
terminus can always be also the initium of the next phase.
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Семиотика А. Греймаса: европейское интеллектуальное 
наследие изнутри и снаружи
В статье исследуется формирование научных взглядов Греймаса: юность в Каунасском 
университете, знакомство с Василием Сеземаном, Львом Карсавиным и идеями 
русского формализма, рождение структурализма в Париже. Основой парижской школы 
семиотики стала книга Греймаса Sémantique structurale (1967), которая, по его словам, 
привела к «третьей семиотической революции» благодаря изобретению модальностей. 
Это сблизило метод Греймаса с аналитической философией и модальной логикой. В 
обеих науках произошел лингвистический поворот и стали пользоваться формальной 
логикой. Семиотика Греймаса преодолела рамки чистой лингвистики, став более 
широким философским подходом. Сейчас его метод считается классикой семиотики. 
Однако метод Греймаса не потерял своей аналитической остроты и эпистемологической 
привлекательности. Даже такие новые парадигмы, как экзистенциальная семиотика, 
органически вырастают из идей Греймаса, сохранивших свою актуальность.
A. J. Greimase semiootika: Euroopa vaimne pärand 
seest- ja väljastpoolt nähtuna
Artikkel käsitleb Greimase mõttemaailma väljakujunemist alates selle varaseimatest allikatest, 
mis pärinesid noorusaastatest Kaunase Ülikoolis, s.t tema sidemetest Wilhelm Sesemanni, 
Lev Karsavini ja vene vormikoolkonnaga, kuni strukturalismi tekkimiseni Pariisis. Pariisi 
koolkonna lähenemise aluseks on Sémantique structurale (1967), mis toob kaasa “kolmanda 
semiootilise revolutsiooni”, nagu Greimas seda nimetas, leiutades modaalsused. See muutis 
tema meetodi sarnaseks ingliskeelse analüütilise fi losoofi a ja modaalloogikaga, kus mõlemas 
toimus lingvistiline pööre ning hakati kasutama formaalloogikat. Ent Greimase semiootika 
kasvas puhtlingvistilisest raamistikust välja avaramaks fi losoofi liseks lähenemiseks. Tänapäeval, 
mil tema meetodit peetakse semiootikavaldkonna klassikasse kuuluvaks, ei ole see kaotanud 
midagi oma analüütilisest teravusest ja episteemilisest köitvusest. Isegi sellised uued paradigmad 
nagu eksistentsiaalne semiootika kasvavad orgaaniliselt välja mõnedest Greimase ideedest, mis 
on säilitanud oma relevantsuse.
